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CONGRESS, GIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY A FAIR FIGHT:
PASSAGE OF THE MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS PARITY
ACT WOULD GIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY THE FINANCIAL
FOOTING NEEDED TO INDEPENDENTLY SUCCEED
I. INTRODUCTION
From recent stories in the national media, it may seem like the
federal government gives renewable energy all its focus and re-
sources.1  However, beneath the surface lies the real truth: Master
Limited Partnerships (MLPs) provide fossil fuels more advantages
than any incentives the federal government offers renewables.2  For
example, in 2014, Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) founded Shell Mid-
stream Partners (Midstream), a Texas-based subsidiary of the global
petroleum giant, to operate and own oil pipelines around the
United States (U.S.).3  Shell set up Midstream as an MLP for the
structure’s financial advantages.4
MLPs are a specific subset of the U.S. Tax Code that provide
significant tax benefits to fossil fuel companies.5  As a result of these
tax benefits, fossil fuel companies pay substantially less income
taxes than traditional publically-traded corporations.6  Under
MLPs, fossil fuel companies only pay income taxes at the share-
holder level, whereas traditional corporations must pay taxes at the
1. See Ben Wolfgang, Obama Vows U.S. Will Triple Renewable Energy by 2030,
WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/
30/obama-vows-us-will-triple-renewable-energy-2030/ (discussing US’s broad re-
newable energy commitment).
2. For a discussion of why Master Limited Partnerships (MLP) are more effec-
tive than any of the federal government’s current renewable energy incentives, see
infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
3. See Sonali Basak, Shell Midstream Climbs in Best Energy Trading Debut, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-28/shell-mid
stream-raises-920-million-in-u-s-pipeline-ipo (last updated Oct. 29, 2014, 4:43 PM)
(discussing Shell Midstream’s partnership with Europe’s biggest oil company).
Royal Dutch Shell currently owns seventy-one percent of the Houston-based Mid-
stream. Id.
4. See id. (describing Shell Midstream’s MLP and its favorable treatment
under Internal Revenue Code (IRC)).
5. See id. (providing that MLPs offer fewer taxes and higher cash returns to
shareholders).
6. See Benefits of MLPs, STOCKS 500, http://news.morningstar.com/class
room2/course.asp?docId=145579&page=4&CN=sample (last visited Sept. 23,
2015) (discussing how MLPs pay substantially less in income taxes than
corporations).
(149)
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entity and individual shareholder level (double taxation).7  Aside
from tax benefits, MLPs can also use national stock exchanges to
fundraise like any other equity security.8
Shell’s MLP, Midstream, took advantage of all these MLP bene-
fits and raised $920 million at its initial public offering.9  The com-
pany has subsequently raised even more capital, with its February
2015 market capitalization standing around $5.4 billion.10  Mid-
stream uses these investor funds to finance crude oil pipelines
around the country.11  Financial firms analyzing Midstream cur-
rently recommend that investors buy company shares because Mid-
stream is well positioned in a strong oil and gas industry.12
Moreover, because of Midstream’s MLP structure, it is able to con-
stantly distribute cash earnings to shareholders.13  While not all
MLPs are thriving, Midstream demonstrates the capabilities of what
an MLP can potentially accomplish under the right
circumstances.14
Renewable energy development companies—enterprises that
bring together customers and renewable technology producers—
do not have the same financial fortune as Midstream, and Congress
refuses to help.15  In enacting favorable tax treatment for fossil fuel
7. See id. (explaining corporate double tax problem and how MLPs avoid it).
8. See id. (explaining reasons why MLPs have fundraising advantages).  For
example, MLPs provide generally high rates of return, predictable cash flows, and
less in taxes, creating an attractive proposition for interested investors. See id.
9. See Basak, supra note 3 (providing initial public offering amount for
Midstream).
10. See Shell Midstream Partners L.P., YAHOO FIN. (Feb.20, 2015), http://finance
.yahoo.com/q?s=SHLX [hereinafter Shell Midstream] (providing Midstream’s finan-
cial and investment statistics).  As of February 20, 2015, Midstream had a market
capitalization of $5.6 billion. Id.  Market capitalization is the number of shares
outstanding multiplied by the price per share. See Market Capitalization, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015).
11. See Shell Midstream supra note 10 (explaining Shell Midstream’s
operations).
12. See Shell Midstream Partners L.P., YAHOO FIN.,  http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/ao?s=SHLX (last updated Oct.2, 2015, 4:04 PM) (recommending investors buy
MLP shares).  On a scale of one to five, where one indicates “strong buy” and five
indicates “strong sell,” the recommendation summary was 2.2 in October 2015,
which supports buying, rather than selling, shares. See id.
13. See Shell Midstream Partners L.P, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/
shlx/recommendations (last updated Oct. 2, 2015) (supporting “buy” recommen-
dation of Shell Midstream as of October 4, 2015).
14. See id. (providing successful statistics regarding Midstream).
15. See Robert Rapier, No Parity for Solar as Congress Slumbers, INVESTING DAILY
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.investingdaily.com/19495/no-parity-for-solar-as-con
gress-slumbers-2/ (highlighting Congress’s failure to pass proposed MLP bill, giv-
ing renewables similar financial advantages to fossil fuels).
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companies, Congress specifically neglected to extend the same ben-
efits to renewable energy companies.16  As a result, renewable en-
ergy companies have less financial capital options and inherently
higher costs of capital than fossil fuel companies.17  For example, a
solar company looking to fundraise in a similar capacity to Mid-
stream may do so either privately or through public funding.18  The
solar company, however, must use a corporate structure in its fun-
draising efforts, rather than an MLP.19  This is less advantageous
than using an MLP because the solar company must pay the corpo-
rate double tax.20  The corporate double tax nomenclature is de-
rived from the federal government’s requirement that all
corporations pay taxes at the entity level as well as the individual
shareholder level.21  By contrast, MLPs save tax dollars by only pay-
ing taxes at the individual shareholder level.22
Since solar companies must use the corporate structure to raise
public capital, private fundraising has become a popular alternative
and can cost significantly less.23  For example, Sun Run, a national
leader in rooftop solar services, opts to remain private because its
16. See Peter Mantius, Fossil Fuels Get Huge Master Limited Partnership Tax Breaks
– “Green” Energy Shut Out, DC BUREAU (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.dcbur
eau.org/201409229967/natural-resources-news-service/multi-billion-dollar-tax-
rules-favor-fossil-fuels-hurt-green-energy-competitors.html (discussing how renewa-
ble energy was neglected when effective lobbying gave some industries continued
use of MLPs).
17. See id. (discussing how current federal renewable energy policy restricts
renewable projects’ capital access).  Extending MLPs to renewables would also give
renewables substantially more capital access at much cheaper rates. Id.
18. See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, How to Make Renewable Energy Competi-
tive, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/opinion/
how-to-make-renewable-energy-competitive.html?pagewanted=2 [hereinafter En-
ergy Competitive] (discussing renewables’ limited fundraising opportunities).  Cur-
rently, only a few deep-pocketed companies invest in renewables. See Joel
Kirkland, Cash-Rich Companies Begin to Make Renewable Energy Investments, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/08/18/18climatewire-cash-
rich-companies-begin-to-make-renewable-e-3023.html. Private investments occur
behind the scenes, and renewable developers cannot always rely on them. Id.  Pub-
lic investing, conversely, occurs on national exchanges through a corporation or
fossil-fuel-related MLP and has more reliable and eligible investors. Id.
19. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (discussing how federal law excludes
MLPs from renewables).
20. See Benefits of MLPs, supra note 6 (explaining negative tax consequences of
traditional corporations).
21. See id. (explaining corporation’s expensive double-tax problem).
22. See id. (discussing how MLPs save organizations from paying taxes).
23. See Eric Wesoff, CEO Lynn Jurich on the Future of Sunrun and Residential So-
lar, Greentech Media (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/CEO-Lynn-Jurich-on-the-Future-of-Sunrun-and-Residential-Solar (discussing
how Sun Run’s decision to privately raise capital is more efficient and “offers a
lower weighted average cost of capital” than going public).
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CEO believes it offers better access to cheaper costs of capital than
if it was a public entity.24
Solar companies can still look to the public markets to raise
capital, but they do so at a disadvantage as compared to fossil fuel
companies.25  Consider the solar energy giant, SolarCity.26  Solar-
City is a publically traded corporation listed on national stock ex-
changes with a similar market capitalization to Midstream.27
SolarCity’s investment profile, however, differs significantly from
Midstream’s profile.28  SolarCity does not pay any cash dividends on
its stock and must pay taxes on all yearly net income.29  Midstream,
conversely, constantly pays cash dividends to its investors and pays
no income taxes on its entity profits.30  Additionally, Midstream
pays substantially less in income tax each year, leaving more cash to
distribute to its shareholders.31  Congress’s preferential treatment
of fossil fuel companies versus renewable energy companies encour-
ages the U.S. to remain addicted to fossil fuels.32
This Comment will demonstrate how Congress can do more to
provide renewables an equal opportunity to compete with fossil fu-
24. See id. (discussing Sun Run’s strategic decision to stick with private capital
over public capital).
25. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (explaining renewable energy’s clear
disadvantage in public capital markets).
26. See SolarCity Corporation, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=SCTY
(last updated Oct.2, 2015, 4:00 PM) (providing SolarCity’s financial statistics).
27. See id. (highlighting SolarCity’s $4.51 billion market capitalization as well
as displaying SolarCity’s stock price in October 2015).
28. See id. (providing no dividend payment for SolarCity unlike Midstream);
see also Shell Midstream, supra note 10 (detailing Shell Midstream’s financial infor-
mation).  Shell Midstream lists dividend payment information as well as a price-
earnings ratio because Midstream’s MLP owners have dividends distributed and
earnings from their MLP investment. See id.  SolarCity, conversely, pays nothing to
investors and has no dividend payment information or price-earnings ratio be-
cause the company makes no payments on the stock. See SolarCity Corporation, supra
note 26. Investors buying SolarCity stock can only realize returns on their invest-
ment by holding the stock and subsequently selling it at a higher price. Id.
29. See SolarCity Corporation, supra note 26 (providing no dividend payment
information). For a discussion of why traditional corporations like SolarCity pay
entity-level taxes, while MLPs like Midstream do not, see infra notes 88-93 and
accompanying text.
30. See Master Limited Partnerships - 101, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, https://
www.lw.com/MLP-Portal/101#economic-structure (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (dis-
cussing how MLPs pay out cash dividends and are tax-free pass-through entities).
31. See id. (explaining how MLPs pay no entity-level income taxes, affording
MLPs more cash flow to distribute back to investors).  As the MLP 101 guide high-
lights, MLPs focus on distributing cash to investors. Id.  Constant cash back to
investors increases the MLP’s market valuation. Id.
32. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (discussing how Congress has en-
couraged traditional energy development through MLPs).  Congress could do the
same with renewables. Id.
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els, as well as highlight the potential benefits the U.S. could reap by
extending the MLP structure to renewable energy.33  Part II of this
Comment provides the relevant facts to understanding why an MLP
structure can be so financially beneficial for companies utilizing
them.34  Part III of this Comment provides a history of the MLP
structure and the current condition of investing in renewable en-
ergy projects.35  Part IV of this Comment analyzes the federal gov-
ernment’s support of renewable energy and describes opportunities
for improvement.36  Finally, Part V assesses the potential impacts
the MLP bill, if the bill passes Congress, could have on implement-
ing renewable energy at the state level.37
II. BUSINESS ENTITIES
In order to truly understand the benefits of the MLP structure,
it is important to have a basic understanding of the different busi-
ness structures available and how these structures work in compari-
son to each other.38  For example, corporations can raise
significantly more money through public markets than a sole pro-
prietorship, but corporations also pay more in taxes and fees.39
This section provides the background knowledge needed to under-
stand the benefits of an MLP structure by discussing the different
business structures, highlighting the various ways business struc-
tures pay taxes and fundraise, and examining how MLPs uniquely
blend the beneficial elements of multiple different business
entities.40
33. For a discussion of the potential benefits the U.S. could realize from ex-
tending MLPs to renewables, see infra notes 164-173 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion on how renewables using MLPs could provide beneficial
and foundational knowledge in business structures, see infra notes 38-93 and ac-
companying text.
35. For a discussion of the relevant historical background information that
affects MLP structure, see infra notes 99-163 and accompanying text.
36. For an analysis of why Congress should extend MLPs to renewables, see
infra notes 223-258 and accompanying text.
37. For a prediction on the potential impacts MLPs could have on renewable
energy capacity implementation, see infra notes 259-274 and accompanying text.
38. See Beth Laurence, Learn About Business Ownership Structures, NOLO LAW
FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/learn-about-business-owner-
ship-structures-29785.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Business Owner-
ship Structures] (discussing different available organizational structures for
business).
39. See id. (explaining how corporations are costlier to administer).  Even
though corporations are costlier to administer, they protect investors from liability,
ensuring that investors are not personally liable for the torts, liabilities, or debts of
the business. Id.
40. For a discussion of the different business structures and the different ways
businesses fundraise and pay taxes, see infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
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A. Non-MLP Entity Structures
When a business forms, its owners generally choose among a
variation of the following four business entities: the sole proprietor-
ship, the partnership, the limited partnership, and the corpora-
tion.41  Each form of business entity has its own advantages and
disadvantages, impacting all significant business decisions.42
Sole proprietorships exist solely through the single person who
starts, owns, and operates the business.43  Sole proprietorships have
no permanence because they die with the individual who owns the
business.44  Unlike sole proprietorships, partnerships form when
two or more persons conduct business together as co-owners for
profit. 45  Partners set forth their specified ownership interests in an
initial partnership agreement.46  Both partnerships and sole propri-
etorships pass all business tort and contract liability to their owners,
making them risky forms of business.47
Limited partnerships help reduce liability for all owners.48
Limited partnerships are similar to partnerships in that they must
have at least one general partner who is liable for contract and tort
damages.49  Limited partnerships are unique, however, because
they use outside investors.50  Limited partnerships allow outside in-
vestors to invest in the partnership without subjecting outside inves-
41. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (discussing different availa-
ble organizational structures).  While the four organizational business structures
share their similarities, some are more costly and difficult to run. Id.  Businesses
take these factors into account when evaluating their business structures. Id.
42. See id. (discussing variations of different business organizations and poten-
tial impacts on business decisions).
43. See Joshua Levenson, Sole Proprietorship Basics,  NOLO LAW FOR ALL,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/sole-proprietorship-basics-29694.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (discussing sole proprietorship basic information and
differentiation from other types of organizational structures).
44. See id. (discussing how sole proprietors are sole owners of the business).
45. See Partnership, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/part-
nership (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (providing partnership’s basic definition).
46. See id. (explaining partnership agreement’s basic information).
47. See Beth Laurence, Partnership Basics, NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/partnership-basics-30072.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2015) [hereinafter Partnership Basics] (discussing partnerships potential for tort
and contract liability).
48. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (discussing how limited
partnerships and corporations reduce outside investors’ potential liability).
49. See id. (providing similarities between limited and general partnerships);
see also Partnership Basics, supra note 47 (discussing how limited partnerships’ gen-
eral partner has general partnership liability).
50. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (explaining how limited
partnerships allow outside investment through limitation of liability).
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tors to general partnership liability.51  Limited partnerships
guarantee that partners are liable only for the financial assets con-
tributed to the business.52  Limited partners thus do not face any
other type of liability.53
Corporations also help reduce liability to all owners.54  They
differ from all of the previous entities described above, however,
because their owners are completely insulated from any personal
liability.55  All of the corporation’s debts and torts live and die with
the corporation, allowing the corporation to exist separately from
its owners.56
B. Taxes and Fundraising
Two important features of any corporate entity are how the en-
tity pays taxes and how the entity acquires capital.57  In a sole pro-
prietorship, the individual owner often funds the business alone.58
Outside investors generally avoid investing in a sole proprietorship
because they can be held personally liable for the business’s con-
tract and tort liability.59  Partnerships function similarly.60  Partner-
ships raise funds directly from their owners.61  Outside investment
in a partnership is highly unlikely because investors would subject
themselves to personal liability, similar to sole proprietorships.62
51. See id. (emphasizing limited partners’ limited liability).
52. See Peri Pakroo, Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Partnerships,
NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/limited-partner
ships-limited-liability-partnerships-29748.html (last visited July 28, 2015) (explain-
ing that limited partners can only lose their financial investment).  Limited part-
ners face no contract or tort liability of the business. Id.
53. See id. (detailing how limited partners do not have to pay off debts in-
curred by the business).
54. See Beth Laurence, Corporation Basics, NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://www.
nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/corporation-basics-29867.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2015) (providing how corporations insulate owners from business debts).
55. See id. (discussing business owners’ limited liability and how corporations
completely separate business from ownership).
56. See id. (explaining unique, infinite life of a corporation).
57. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (explaining corporation’s
different ways of paying taxes); see also Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (providing
different corporate structures’ fundraising advantages).
58. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (discussing how sole propri-
etorships exist through sole owners).
59. See id. (providing that sole proprietors are personally liable for all business
debts and liabilities).
60. See Pakroo, supra note 52 (discussing how general partnership partners
are personally liable for all business debts and liabilities).
61. See id. (comparing ways limited partnerships and partnerships raise busi-
ness capital).
62. See id. (differentiating between general partners’ personal liability and
limited partners’ limited liability).
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Limited partnerships and corporations solve the outside invest-
ment liability problem by allowing outside investors to put money
into an entity while limiting any liability to the investor’s total finan-
cial contribution to the business.63  Investors in limited partner-
ships and corporations are more willing to invest because their
potential risk is limited to the amount of money invested, whereas
partnership and sole proprietorship investors could be at risk for all
the business’s liabilities.64  Corporate management also prefers lim-
ited partnerships and corporations for large, fast-growing compa-
nies because these business structures provide broad access to
capital, thereby allowing companies to rapidly expand.65
The taxation of these different business entities also motivates
owners’ decisions about which type of business structure to use.66
Sole proprietorships accrue all profits and losses directly to their
owners and the owners pay taxes on these profits at their individual
tax rate.67  Partnerships and limited partnerships function the same
way.68  Profits and losses flow through to the partners according to
their proportionate ownership interests and partners pay income
taxes on earnings at their personal tax rate.69  Sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and limited partnerships do not pay any entity-level
tax.70
63. See Business Ownership Structures, supra note 38 (explaining how limited
partnerships and corporations separate purely financial investors from personally
guaranteeing business debts and liabilities).  This separation of ownership allows
for much more capital and outside investment because purely financial owners
cannot be held personally liable for any debts or liabilities of the business. Id.
64. See id. (elaborating on general partners’ personal responsibility, as com-
pared to limited partners and corporate investor’s limited liability).
65. See Beth Laurence, Choosing the Best Ownership Structure for Your Business,
NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/business-owner-
ship-structure-choose-best-29618.html (last visited July 28, 2015) [hereinafter Best
Ownership Structure] (emphasizing how corporations and limited partnerships
make raising capital easier than other business structures).
66. See id. (highlighting how business owners should make income tax consid-
erations before determining which type of corporate entity to use).
67. See id. (explaining how sole proprietorships are pass-through entities).
68. See id. (detailing how partnerships and limited partnerships are also pass-
through entities).
69. See id. (detailing how profits and losses flow through to individual own-
ers).  Furthermore, individual owners report these earnings or losses in their per-
sonal income tax returns. Id.
70. See Best Ownership Structure, supra note 65 (explaining pass-through enti-
ties).  Pass-through entities pay no corporate taxes because all profits and losses
pass through to individual investors. Id.  Individual investors pay taxes on these
profits in accordance with their individual tax rates. Id.
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Corporations are in a less fortunate position.71  Corporations
instead pay multiple levels of taxes.72  Specifically, they pay taxes at
the entity level and at the individual shareholder level on any earn-
ings the corporation distributes.73  In essence, corporations may
pay entity level corporate taxes as high as thirty-five percent in the
U.S.74  For example, if Wal-Mart earns one billion dollars in profits
in 2015, then Wal-Mart must pay $350 million in federal income
taxes.75
After corporations pay entity-level taxes, they often make cash
distributions, called dividends, to shareholders to provide investors
some return on investment.76  Shareholders receiving dividends
must pay an additional fifteen percent tax on the dividends re-
ceived; therefore, shareholders pay a second tax on the company’s
profits after the corporation has already paid federal entity-level
taxes.77  In the Wal-Mart example above, Wal-Mart could distribute
the $650 million of after-tax profit to its shareholders, and the
shareholders would have to pay an additional fifteen percent on
their received share.78  In sum, corporations are the only entities
that face this expensive, double-tax burden.79
71. See id. (describing how corporations pay entity-level taxes and taxes on
dividends received).
72. See id. (discussing expensive administrative burden on corporations); see
also William McBride, America’s Shrinking Corporate Sector, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 6,
2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/america-s-shrinking-corporate-sector
(discussing U.S. companies’ reluctance to use traditional corporations).
73. See Best Ownership Structure, supra note 65 (discussing corporation’s multi-
ple layers of taxes).
74. See Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG (2014), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/
en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-
rates-table.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015) (providing U.S. corporate tax rates).
75. See id. (citing U.S. corporate tax rate at thirty-five percent).  The highest
marginal tax rate for corporations is thirty-five percent. Id.
76. See Beth Laurence, How Corporations Are Taxed, NOLO LAW FOR ALL,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-corporations-are-taxed-30157.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (discussing corporations’ different levels of taxes, in-
cluding dividend payments to shareholders).
77. See id. (discussing corporate double taxation problem); see also Tax Treat-
ment of Dividend Income, WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, https://www.wellsfargoadvisors.
com/market-economy/financial-articles/investing/dividend-income-tax.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015) (providing qualified dividends tax range between ten and
twenty percent).  Qualified dividends are U.S. corporate dividends paid on com-
mon or preferred stock. Id.  For qualified dividends, individuals pay reduced capi-
tal gains tax rates. Id.  The article’s fifteen percent mark is a simple average of the
reduced capital gains tax rates. Id.
78. See Tax Treatment of Dividend Income, supra note 77 (discussing dividend tax
rate).
79. See Best Ownership Structure, supra note 65 (proclaiming how only corpora-
tions face burdensome double-taxation problem).
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C. MLP Structure
MLPs blend the advantages of a partnership, limited partner-
ship, and corporation into one distinct corporate entity.80  MLPs
incorporate some elements of partnerships because they require a
general partner to own at least two percent of the business and to
be personally liable for its contract and tort liability.81  MLPs also
function like limited partnerships, however, because they allow lim-
ited partners to invest money into the business, with personal liabil-
ity limited to each limited partner’s financial investment.82  Finally,
MLPs have the fundraising advantages of traditional public corpo-
rations because they trade on national exchanges.83
MLPs are different from traditional limited partnerships be-
cause traditional limited partnerships do not have access to all of
the capital available on national exchanges.84  Traditional limited
partnerships have much smaller investor pools, thus making capital
more difficult to acquire.85  Conversely, MLPs have a much broader
potential investor pool because they can raise money from any in-
vestor willing to invest.86  Additionally, MLPs also make investors
more comfortable investing because investors can track their capital
performance on national exchanges, whereas they cannot in a typi-
cal private investment.87
MLPs do not pay entity-level taxes.88  MLPs are only required
to pay taxes on earnings at the individual investor level, like a part-
80. See David Feldman & Edward Settle, Master Limited Partnerships and Real
Estate Investment Trusts: Opportunities and Potential Complications for Renewable Energy,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 5 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy14osti/60413.pdf (discussing MLPs generally and their main advantages).
81. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (discussing basics of MLP
structure).
82. See id. (highlighting MLP investors’ limited liability).
83. See id. (explaining MLP’s fundraising advantages).
84. See Pakroo, supra note 52 (discussing general partners’ personal liability
for all business debts and liabilities).
85. See id. (explaining greater potential for liability in general partnerships).
Since all general partners must pay their share of the partnership’s debts and lia-
bilities, independent financial investors typically stay away from investing in gen-
eral partnerships. Id.
86. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (defining MLPs and stat-
ing they must be publically traded).
87. See id. (explaining that MLPs must be publically traded).  Because MLPs
must be publically traded, they are listed on national exchanges making it easier
for investors to keep track of their earnings. Id.
88. See id. (providing how MLPs are taxed as pass-through entities).  “[T]his
tax savings contributes to the cost of capital advantage enjoyed by MLPs over simi-
larly situated corporations.” Id.
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nership or limited partnership.89  Thus, MLPs avoid the expensive
double-taxation that burdens corporations.90  This tax savings is a
subtle advantage to MLPs that compounds over time.91  By avoiding
entity-level taxes, MLPs can retain more capital than corporations
and distribute more capital to investors.92  Investors prefer invest-
ments which provide a high rate of return, thus avoiding entity-level
taxation gives MLPs a strong fundraising advantage over
corporations.93
III. BACKGROUND
To understand why MLPs trump any current federal renewable
financial incentives, it is helpful to understand their history in the
U.S. and why Congress has limited and continues to limit their for-
mation.94  This section explains how Congress’s current system
works, how the current system has unintended negative conse-
quences, and how Congress can remedy the situation by extending
MLPs to renewables.95
A. MLP Structure in the U.S.
Arguably, many American businesses would take advantage of
the preferential MLP structure if given the opportunity.96  Unfortu-
nately, the significant financial advantages of the MLP structure are
only offered to a limited number of congressionally-preferred busi-
89. See id. (reiterating that MLP investors only pay taxes at their personal
levels).
90. See id. (emphasizing advantage of MLPs over other corporate entities).
91. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (discussing robust market
for MLPs because they avoid entity-level taxes).
92. See id. (emphasizing that investors like MLPs because of their unusually
high returns).
93. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (highlighting that “cash is
king” in MLPs, allowing them to thrive because they return money to investors).
94. See id. (discussing history of MLPs in U.S.).
95. See id. (explaining how MLPs operate under current federal law). See also
Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (focusing on negative effects of Congress’s current
tax regime and how Congress can easily remedy renewables funding problems).
96. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (discussing advantages of
MLPs that make them appealing investments). Many businesses used MLPs before
Congress restricted their use. Id.  Considering MLPs’ substantial tax advantages,
there is little reason to think that things would work out any differently if Congress
once again allows for broad MLP usage. Id.
11
Magagna: Congress, Give Renewable Energy a Fair Fight: Passage of the Mast
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
160 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 149
nesses structures.97  Since the rise in popularity of MLPs in the early
1980s, Congress has substantially limited their use.98
In 1981, Apache Oil (Apache) created the first MLP by com-
bining thirty-three oil and gas limited partnerships into one large
partnership.99  Apache’s new corporate structure raised capital like
a traditional corporation; Apache, however, only paid taxes at the
individual investor level.100  Thus, Apache’s newly formed MLP
structure revealed the substantial tax savings MLPs offer to the in-
vestment community.101
On a dollar-per-dollar basis, MLP tax savings continually prove
to be substantial when compared to a traditional corporation.102
For example, a traditional corporation with ten thousand dollars in
pre-tax net income pays over five thousand dollars in entity and
shareholder level federal income taxes, while an MLP with the same
net income pays only four thousand dollars in federal income
taxes.103  Tax advantages like these allow the MLP to save substan-
tial sums of money each year.104
Several financially-savvy companies noticed Apache’s MLP
structure and chose to follow suit, taking advantage of the tax and
fundraising advantages MLPs provide.105  Many different industries
started using MLPs including hotels, amusement parks, and sports
teams.106  In 1987, Congress recognized MLPs could potentially de-
stroy the country’s tax base, and subsequently decided to take ac-
97. See id. (discussing how Congress limited MLP use to very select industries
including oil, gas, and real estate).
98. See id. (detailing Congress’s MLP limitation strategy and its impact on
MLP formation).
99. See Feldman & Settle, supra note 80, at 5 (revealing how MLPs emerged in
U.S.).
100. See id. (highlighting Apache’s tax advantages).
101. See id. (detailing how Apache’s MLP structure inspired other companies
to follow suit).
102. See Doug Koplow, Too Big to Ignore: Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Master Limited
Partnerships, OIL CHANGE INT’L, 17 (July 2013), available at http://priceofoil.org/
content/uploads/2013/07/OCI_MLP_2013.pdf (charting estimated lost govern-
ment revenues from companies’ MLP usage).
103. See id. (providing examples and specific calculations).  The calculations
in this simple example are based on the current U.S. thirty-five percent corporate
tax rate, as well as the favorable fifteen percent long-term capital gains tax rate. Id.
at 16-17.
104. See id. at 17 (demonstrating how MLPs pay less in taxes than
corporations).
105. See Feldman & Settle, supra note 80, at 5 (discussing companies that fol-
lowed Apache’s lead by forming MLPs).
106. See id. (highlighting different industries that began to operate as MLPs).
12
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tion.107  Congress’s worry derived from the fact that MLPs’ tax
savings were readily apparent to nearly all companies.108
Consequently, to stop the growth of MLPs, Congress placed
substantial limitations on which companies could use them.109  De-
spite the limitations, Congress made exceptions for the real estate
and fossil fuel industries.110  Congress passed the MLP limitations
and related exceptions as part of its 1987 Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act.111  This Act substantially limited MLP usage, made
narrow exceptions for powerful industries as a result of effective
lobbying, and specifically excluded renewable energy companies
from ever using MLPs.112  At the time, congressional staffers who
drafted the 1987 legislation had no idea how beneficial the legisla-
tion would be for fossil fuels, and they consequently did not appre-
ciate how the legislation would stifle renewable energy
development.113
B. The Current State of Investing in Renewable Energy Projects
Investing in renewable energy has improved recently due to
technological improvements and discounts in production. 114  For
example, Chinese-manufactured solar panels have drastically re-
duced the per watt installation cost of solar energy.115  In 2011, Chi-
107. See id. (discussing Congress’s desire to limit MLP usage).
108. See id. (describing Congress’s worries over corporate tax base erosion).
109. See Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (stating that Congress
substantially limited MLP usage in 1987).
110. See Mantius, supra note 16 (explaining why Congress extended MLP us-
age exclusively to real estate and fossil-fuel industries).
111. See Lynn Comer Jones et al., Master Limited Partnerships: Tax and Invest-
ment Issues, CPA J., https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-1614453661/master-
limited-partnerships-tax-and-investment-issues (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) (providing
that Congress limited MLP usage as part of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act).
112. See Feldman & Settle, supra note 80, at 5 (discussing how Congress’s ac-
tions disadvantaged renewables).
113. See Zachary R. Mider, It Pays to Own an Energy Pipeline. Thanks, Tax Code,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-01-24/it-pays-to-own-an-energy-pipeline-dot-thanks-tax-code (discussing how
MLP bill authors had no idea how important its exception would become for fossil
fuels).
114. See Laura Paddison, 10 Things You Should Know About Investment in Renew-
able Energy, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/investment-renewables-10-things-climate-change (illustrating
solar and wind projects’ sound economics).  After financing methods are consid-
ered, solar and wind projects make more practical sense than initially appears. Id.
115. See Stephen Lacey, Top Chinese Manufacturers Will Produce Solar Panels for
42 Cents Per Watt in 2015, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.green
techmedia.com/articles/read/top-chinese-manufacturers-will-produce-solar-
panels-for-42-cents-a-wat (discussing Chinese manufacturers’ ability to cut solar
panel costs).
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nese solar panels cost about $1.31 per watt to install; by 2014, the
same Chinese solar panels only cost $0.50 per watt to install.116
These cost savings can be attributed to cost reductions and efficien-
cies in solar production.117
Unfortunately, these important technological advances and
substantial cost savings have not been as impactful as possible be-
cause the renewable energy industry still needs more financial capi-
tal to accomplish its goals.118  Financial capital for renewable
energy projects, for the most part, remains prohibitively expensive
because renewables cannot take advantage of inexpensive public
capital like their fossil fuel competitors.119  As a result, the renewa-
ble energy industry still relies on expensive private capital from in-
dividual companies and investors.120  The renewable energy
industry desperately needs financial innovation for two reasons:
(1) to allow renewable energy to compete with fossil fuels; and
(2) to increase future renewable energy capacity development.121
116. See Giles Parkinson, Why Solar Costs Will Fall Another 40% in Just Two Years,
RENEWECONOMY (Jan. 20, 2015), http://reneweconomy.com.au/2015/why-solar-
costs-will-fall-another-40-in-just-two-years-21235 (citing statistics about significant
drops in solar panel prices).
117. See id. (discussing improved solar equipment costs and solar installation
efficiencies developed).
118. See Policy Uncertainty and Lack of Renewable Energy Expertise Deters Institu-
tional Investors, EY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-
releases/News_Policy-uncertainty-and-lack-of-renewable-energy-expertise-deters-in
stitutional-investors (discussing solar industry’s lack of institutional financial invest-
ment).  In a capital-intensive industry, such as renewable energy, institutional in-
vestment is crucial for success. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18.  Institutional
capital, such as mutual funds and endowment funds, can provide the renewable
energy industry the upfront capital needed to complete large-scale renewable
deals. Id.
119. See Keith Martin, Drive to Reduce the Cost of Capital; Renewable Energy Compa-
nies and the Obama Administration are Looking for Ways to Reduce the Cost of Capital for
Renewable Energy Projects, CHADBOURNE (Apr. 2013), http://www.chadbourne.com/
Drive_to_Reduce_the_Cost_of_Capital_projectfinance/ (discussing renewables
current expensive funding sources and desire for cheaper alternatives).
120. See Jurgen Weiss & Mark Sarro, The Importance of Long-term Contracting for
Facilitating Renewable Energy Project Development, THE BRATTLE GROUP, 12 (May 7,
2013), http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/927/original
/The_Importance_of_Long-Term_Contracting_for_Facilitating_Renewable_Ener
gy_Project_Development_Weiss_Sarro_May_7_2013.pdf?1380317003 (explaining
that renewable projects typically rely on privately-placed capital).
121. See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Invest But Reform, Smarter Finance for
Cleaner Energy: Open Up Master Limited Partnerships (MLPS) and Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITS) to Renewable Energy Investment, BROOKINGS, 2 (Nov. 2012), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/11/13-federal
ism/13-clean-energy-investment.pdf [hereinafter Invest But Reform] (discussing re-
newable energy industry’s financial innovation and how it did not keep pace with
renewables’ related technological innovation).  The cost of renewable projects
continues to drop as manufacturers develop less expensive and more efficient
14
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Renewable energy project financing is currently limited,
scarce, and expensive.122  Most renewable energy project funding
comes from Congress’s 2009 American Recovery and Reconstruc-
tion Act in the form of tax credits and accelerated depreciation.123
The Act’s funding, however, is depleting, and Congress is reluctant
to pass any additional renewable energy tax credits.124  For exam-
ple, in 2014, Congress let the wind power industry’s vital produc-
tion tax credit expire.125  Congress could do the same with the solar
industry’s investment tax credit in 2016.126  Uncertainty surround-
ing the future of renewable energy tax credits is an inefficient way
for the government to support renewables.127
The federal government’s tax credit and accelerated deprecia-
tion incentives are also inefficient because most corporations, in-
cluding renewable developers, do not have large enough tax
liabilities to take advantage of the tax credits or large enough taxa-
ble incomes to take advantage of renewable projects’ accelerated
depreciation.128  To utilize a one-dollar tax credit, a corporation
processes. See Lacey, supra note 115.  Renewable capacity, however, has not kept
pace with the improvements in technology because financial capital for renewable
projects remains prohibitively expensive. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18.
122. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 2-3 (explaining modern renewa-
ble energy finance faces expensive realities).
123. See id. (discussing how most renewable energy funding comes from
American Recovery and Reconstruction Act).
124. See id. (elucidating to Congress’s fickle nature around renewable energy
subsidies); see also Trefis Team, Solar Investment Tax Credit: Does Republican Win In-
crease Uncertainty on Extension?, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/11/06/solar-investment-tax-credit-does-
republican-win-increase-uncertainty-on-extension/ (discussing how House’s cur-
rent Republican composition might make it difficult to extend Solar’s investment
tax credit beyond 2016).
125. See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), DSIRE, http://pro
grams.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/734 (last updated Apr. 13, 2015) (em-
phasizing how Congress let wind industry’s production tax credit expire in 2014).
126. See id. (showing Congress’s ability to let important tax credits expire); see
also Team, supra note 124 (discussing Congress’s desire to let Solar’s investment
tax credit expire in 2016).
127. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (highlighting Congress’s fickle na-
ture and why tax credits provide inefficient renewable support).  Renewable tax
credits are an inefficient way to support renewable energy because investors re-
main uncertain about whether Congress will continue to permit these credits to
exist. Id.  Outside investors, such as companies and individuals, do not like uncer-
tainty regarding an investment because it does not provide for guarantees related
to a project’s rate of return. Id.  Congress’s current regime related to credits needs
to gain more certainty to encourage more investment and more reliable rates of
return. Id.
128. See id. (discussing how renewable energy projects struggle to take advan-
tage of tax benefits).
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must have a one-dollar tax liability to offset.129  Renewable develop-
ers face significant financial expenditures when beginning new
projects, including purchasing equipment and materials like solar
panels, wind turbines, and project engineers.130  Considering re-
newable projects’ substantial upfront costs, it could take years for a
project to be profitable and generate enough tax liability to take
advantage of federal tax credits.131  Thus, developers will not re-
ceive any financial benefits until their projects generate enough
profit to offset their losses so they actually have federal tax
liability.132
The federal government’s tax credit support of renewables
does not match the modern realities of renewable project develop-
ment.133  Developers need cash rebates up front to help pay renew-
able projects’ large fixed costs including solar panels, wind
turbines, and engineering design.134  Congress’s current tax regime
fails because it provides developers with financial benefits too late
in projects’ life cycles.135
A similar problem occurs with accelerated depreciation.136  Ac-
celerated deprecation allows renewable energy developers to re-
duce their projects’ net income by a higher than usual depreciation
129. See Roberton Williams, Income Tax Issues: What is the Difference Between Tax
Deductions and Tax Credits?, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/briefing-book/background/issues/credits.cfm (last updated Sept. 26, 2011)
(explaining how companies actually use tax credits under U.S. tax code).
130. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (explaining renewables high up-
front capital costs).
131. See id. (discussing how renewable projects’ return on investment takes
numerous years).
132. See Renewable Electricity Faces Financing Challenges with the End of Federal
1603 Grant Program, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FIN. (June 29, 2012, 12:42 PM),
https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/renewable-electricity-faces-financing-
challenges-end-federal-1603-grant-program (explaining 1603 cash grant program).
The 1603 cash grant program was a federal program designed to help renewable
developers implement projects because they no longer had to rely on outside par-
ties to monetize tax benefits. Id.  When the 1603 cash grant program expired,
renewable developers again found it difficult to monetize their project’s tax bene-
fits because they were forced to rely on outside third parties. Id.
133. See id. (providing 1603 grant program’s expiration date).  Without the
1603 grant program, developers again must rely on third-party financiers. Id.
134. See id. (explaining how 1603’s up-front government payment made it eas-
ier for renewable developers to complete projects).
135. See id. (explaining that 1603’s expiration makes it more difficult for de-
velopers to complete renewable projects). The ending of 1603 makes it much
more difficult for developers because they can only obtain their project’s tax bene-
fits late in their project’s life cycle unless they secure outside investment. Id.
136. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (discussing how renewable projects
struggle to utilize accelerated depreciation).
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allowance and thereby creates a similar problem.137  For example, a
corporate rooftop solar array may cost $100,000 and have an ex-
pected life of twenty years.138  Through accelerated depreciation,
Congress allows the developer to recoup the cost of this income-
producing asset with a yearly tax deduction from the project’s net
income.139  Under the customary straight-line depreciation
method, Congress allows this renewable energy developer to deduct
five thousand dollars per year from his project’s net income for
twenty years ($100,000/20 years).140  Under the more favorable ac-
celerated depreciation regime, Congress allows this same renewable
developer to take substantial depreciation deductions early in the
project’s life cycle.141  For example, the developer can deduct
twenty thousand dollars per year from the project’s net income for
the project’s first five years.142  Based on the accelerated cost recov-
ery, the renewable developer can use additional funds to invest else-
where, such as in more renewable energy projects.143
While these depreciation deductions are certainly beneficial,
they will not be useful unless the renewable developer’s project has
enough taxable income to reduce.144  Tax deductions like these can
only be used when the taxpayer has sufficient taxable income to
offset.145  Renewable projects usually do not have substantial taxa-
ble incomes early in the project’s life cycle because of all the expen-
sive capital investment.146
137. See The Tax Break-Down: Accelerated Depreciation, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPON-
SIBLE FED. BUDGET (Sept. 20, 2013), http://crfb.org/blogs/tax-break-down-acceler
ated-depreciation (explaining how accelerated depreciation works).
138. See id. (explaining how depreciation calculations are configured).
139. See Jim Mueller, Depreciation: Straight-Line vs. Double-Declining Methods, IN-
VESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/06/depreciation.asp (last vis-
ited Dec. 21, 2015) (explaining both straight line and accelerated deprecation).
140. See id. (comparing straight-line depreciation to an accelerated deprecia-
tion method: double-declining balance).
141. See id. (showing accelerated depreciation model using double-declining
balance method).
142. See id. (showing accelerated depreciation method).
143. See id. (demonstrating larger accelerated depreciation balances).  Under
accelerated depreciation, the developer recoups an investment much faster than
under the straight-line depreciation method. Id.
144. See Kirkland, supra note 18 (explaining how cash-rich companies help
renewable developers utilize their project’s tax benefits).  Without cash-rich com-
panies’ contributions, renewable developers cannot independently take advantage
of their project’s tax benefits. Id.
145. See id. (discussing cash-rich corporations partnering with renewable de-
velopers).  Cash-rich companies have ample taxable incomes and tax liabilities to
use the renewable project’s tax benefits. Id.
146. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (explaining renewables substan-
tial up-front capital costs).
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In response to Congress’s well-intentioned—but poorly de-
signed—renewable incentives, investment professionals created a
“tax-equity” market.147  The tax-equity market emerged as a solu-
tion to renewable energy developers’ funding problems.148  In this
market, renewable energy developers team with large, multi-na-
tional corporations that provide up-front renewable project funds
in exchange for the renewable energy project’s tax benefits.149  The
large corporations partnering with renewable developers have the
required substantial taxable incomes and tax liabilities to use the
project’s accelerated depreciation and tax credit benefits.150  Re-
newable developers trade their project’s tax benefits for the multi-
national corporation’s financial capital.151
While efficient in theory, the tax-equity market has proven to
be prohibitively expensive and an ineffective way to support renewa-
ble developers.152  For example, most tax equity investors are large
multi-national banks looking to offset their own substantial tax lia-
bilities and incomes.153  These banks provide renewable developers
with the up-front capital required, but they charge steep and unaf-
fordable prices.154  Tax-equity investing also imposes wasteful ad-
ministrative spending for both the renewable developer and the
multi-national corporation entering the deal.155  In order to com-
plete a tax-equity project, renewable developers and the interested
multi-national corporation must hire expensive professionals such
147. See Josh Lutton, Tax Equity 101: Structures, WOODLAWN ASSOCIATES MGMT.
CONSULTING (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.woodlawnassociates.com/tax-equity-101/
(explaining circumstances under which tax-equity market developed).
148. See id. (providing how tax-equity market originated and listing compa-
nies who have helped provide “tax equity” to renewable developers).
149. See id. (explaining tax-equity structure between renewable developers
and corporations).
150. See id. (demonstrating benefits of partnering with corporations to form
tax-equity market).
151. See Liz Hoffman, Tax Equity Financing Lures Corporations to Renewables,
LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2012, 3:33 PM), https://www.akingump.com/images/content/9/
3/v4/9302/Tax-Equity-Financing-Lures-Corporations-To-Renewables.pdf (illus-
trating how Google has given renewable developers substantial sums of cash in
exchange for their projects’ significant tax benefits).
152. See id. (discussing how tax-equity market is not cost-effective).
153. See Dipa Sharif et al., The Return - and Returns - of Tax Equity for US Renewa-
ble Projects, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., 3 (Nov. 21, 2011), available at https://
www.cohnreznick.com/sites/default/files/The%20Return%20%E2%80%93%20
and%20Returns%20%E2%80%93%20of%20Tax%20Equity%20for%20US%20Re
newable%20Projects.pdf (discussing renewable developer’s typical tax-equity
partner).
154. See id. at 24 (discussing banks’ role in typical tax-equity transaction).
155. See Hoffman, supra note 151 (discussing why tax-equity investing is unrea-
sonably expensive).
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as tax accountants and attorneys to ensure the deal is structured so
the multi-national corporation takes advantage of all the project’s
tax benefits.156  While Congress may not have intended the emer-
gence of a tax-equity market, its current renewable support regime
has led to renewable developers paying exorbitant prices for so-
cially, environmentally, and economically beneficial projects.157
Unlike its treatment of renewable developers, the Internal Rev-
enue Code (IRC) allows fossil fuel developers to take advantage of
the MLP structure and  access inexpensive public capital markets
cheaply.158 Fossil fuel developers also save on transaction costs by
avoiding the expensive professional fees associated with tax-equity
deals in the renewable energy sector.159
IV. ANALYSIS: CONGRESS MUST ACT AND EXTEND MLPS TO
RENEWABLES
This section demonstrates that MLPs are the superior choice
for the renewable energy industry by showing their ability to gener-
ate substantial returns on investment (ROI).160  Furthermore, this
section highlights Congress’s unexplainable reasons for denying
MLPs to renewables and illustrates how Congress can alleviate all
these concerns by extending MLPs to renewables.161 This section,
however, also explains why these potential shortcomings are insig-
nificant.162  This section concludes by addressing the potential
shortcomings associated with extending MLPs to renewable
developers.163
156. See id. (explaining how renewable energy financing is expensive and
limited).
157. See id. (discussing cost associated with Congress’s lack of support for re-
newable capital).
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704 (2012) (permitting fossil fuels to utilize MLPs while
specifically excluding renewable energy).
159. See Scott Fisher, Tax Credits, Tax Equity, and Alternatives to Spur Clean En-
ergy Financing, U.S. PARTNERSHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., http://uspref.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Tax-Credits-Tax-Equity-for-Clean-Energy-Financ
ing.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (detailing specific costs associated with custom-
ary tax-equity transactions).
160. See Mantius, supra note 16 (showing how MLP ROIs are superior to S&P
stock index ROIs).
161. See id. (discussing Congress’s inexplicable reasons for denying renew-
ables access to MLPs); see also Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (discussing
advantages of MLPs and why Congress should extend them to renewables).
162. See Mantius, supra note 16 (discussing why MLP bill’s potential shortcom-
ings are inconsequential
163. See id. (addressing why MLP bill’s shortcomings can be overlooked).
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A. MLPs Generate Substantial ROIs and Savings Renewables
Need
MLP investments outperform most traditional equity invest-
ments.164 According to one commentator, “$1,000 invested [ten]
years ago in MLPs would have a value of $4,924, while $1,000 in-
vested in Standard & Poor’s stock index over the same period
would be worth $2,116.”165  MLPs generate substantial ROIs be-
cause their structure allows companies to distribute nearly all of the
profits to their investors.166  MLPs are thus a popular investment for
investors and companies.167
MLPs can also potentially save the renewable energy industry
substantial sums of money.168  Industry experts estimate that total
wind project costs would drop by forty percent if the renewable en-
ergy industry utilized MLPs.169  MLPs facilitate substantial reduc-
tions in project capital costs because their structure increases
companies’ access to capital supply.170  This increased capital sup-
ply is the result of growing national interest to invest in MLPs due
to their proven track record and substantial returns.171  The mass of
interested investors allows MLPs to pay less to borrow money for
their capital supply.172  The presence of more investors drives down
the cost of capital because the bargaining power shifts from the in-
164. See Richard Moroney, Unlocking the MLP, FORBES (May 6, 2013, 2:31 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/newsletters/dow-theory-forecasts/2013/05/06/unlocking
-the-mlp/ (providing that Alerian MLP Index has substantially outperformed S&P
500 Index over the past fifteen years).  The Alerian MLP Index allows investors to
invest in a fund that tracks the performance of all MLPs. Id.  The Alerian MLP
Index has consistently outperformed the corporate stock S&P 500 Index. Id.
165. See Mantius, supra note 16 (comparing ROI for MLPs as opposed to S&P
stock index).
166. See id. (explaining ability of MLPs to provide substantial returns to
investors).
167. See id. (discussing growing popularity of retail and institutional investors
to invest in MLPs); see also Master Limited Partnerships 101, supra note 30 (discussing
MLP’s investor base).
168. See Mantius, supra note 16 (providing statistics for renewables’ potential
savings with MLPs).
169. See id. (highlighting specific financial advantages of MLPs including all
the reduced costs related to turbines, equipment, and engineering).
170. See id. (discussing how effective lobbying extended MLPs to only certain
industries).
171. See Javier E. David, Investors Flock to Energy Partnerships in New Shale Play,
CNBC (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/03/investing-in-
mlps-master-limited-partnerships-feed-off-us-energy-boom.html (discussing height-
ened interest in investing in MLPs).
172. See id. (discussing all parties interested in MLP investing).
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dividual investor to the renewable developer, who is now capable of
completing more projects.173
B. The Federal Government’s Role and the Extension of the
MLP Structure to the Renewable Energy Industry
Congress determines who may take advantage of the MLP
structure.174  Congress exercised this authority in 1987 when it
passed IRC Section 7704, which limits MLP usage to companies
who derive ninety percent or more of their income from congres-
sionally-specified  sources.175  The legislation’s qualifying source
language includes income derived from most natural resources ex-
cept for renewable energy.176  In 2008, Congress amended Section
7704’s definition of “qualifying income” to include carbon dioxide,
ethanol, biodiesel, and other alternative fuels.177  Congress, how-
ever, expressly refused to address renewable energy, waiting until its
planned comprehensive tax reform.178
Congress’s refusal to extend the MLP structure to renewable
energy has widespread environmental implications.179  Congress’s
decision to keep MLPs from renewable energy functions essentially
as a “reverse carbon tax” by incentivizing investors to continue to
invest in tax-preferred fossil fuel MLPs rather than renewable en-
ergy.180  Current industry investment statistics support this the-
ory.181  Since 2008, investors have poured hundreds of billions of
dollars into traditional fossil fuel companies, bolstering an already
strong industry, while ignoring the capital-hungry renewable energy
industry.182  Congress’s refusal to extend the MLP structure to the
renewable energy industry discretely perpetuates the country’s con-
173. See id. (explaining how industry’s influx of capital will lead to dynamic
change).
174. See Mantius, supra note 16 (discussing Congress’s past IRC amendment
to offer MLPs to more industries).
175. See id. (detailing effects of Congress’s past amendment on companies’
ability to use MLPs).
176. See id. (emphasizing how Congress specifically did not include renewable
energy in its legislation).
177. See id. (discussing more recent congressional amendments).
178. See id. (providing details of Congress’s 2008 amendment).
179. See Mantius, supra note 16 (discussing Congress’s refusal to extend MLPs
to renewables).  Fossil fuels remain a financially advantageous investment choice
because Congress continues to reject subsidizing renewables. Id.
180. See id. (mentioning “reverse carbon tax” as reason to prefer fossil fuels).
181. See id. (discussing how billions have recently been invested in fossil fuel
MLPs).
182. See id. (discussing investment community’s continued and substantial in-
vestment in tax-preferred fossil fuel MLPs).
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tinued reliance on fossil fuels.183  Congress has the power to change
this trajectory, but most legislators refuse to address the issue; they
instead prefer to wait until Congress fully addresses all tax issues
through comprehensive tax reform.184
C. Congress’s Opportunity
Delaware U.S. Senator (Sen.), Christopher Coons, recently
proposed a bill that would level the financial playing field for all
types of energy development.185  Sen. Coon’s bill, titled the Master
Limited Partnerships Parity Act (MLP bill), focuses on extending
the MLP structure to all energy projects, including renewable en-
ergy.186  The MLP bill specifically focuses on resolving the current
tax loophole that allows only fossil fuel developers to take advan-
tage of MLPs.187  To this end, the MLP bill seeks to amend Section
7704’s “qualifying income” definition to include inexhaustible en-
ergy sources, in addition to exhaustible energy sources.188
The MLP bill has received strong bi-partisan support, and has a
companion bill in the House of Representatives. 189  The academic
community also strongly supports the MLP bill.190  In 2012, two
Stanford University professors wrote an opinion-editorial in the New
York Times endorsing the MLP bill and urging Congress to adopt
it.191  The professors argued that the MLP bill would improve the
renewable energy industry’s access to capital in a more efficient
manner than the country’s current tax-credit system.192  The profes-
sors implored Congress to give renewable energy developers the
183. See id. (disclosing “reverse carbon tax” as basis for continuing reliance on
fossil fuels).
184. See Mantius, supra note 16 (detailing legislators’ reluctance to pass MLP
bill).
185. See Chris Coons, The Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, U.S. SENATOR
CHRISTOPHER COONS OF DEL., http://www.coons.senate.gov/issues/master-limited-
partnerships-parity-act (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (discussing MLP bill proposal).
186. See id. (summarizing MLP bill proposal).
187. See id. (illustrating MLP bill’s proposed amendments and benefits for
renewable energy).
188. See id. (citing MLPs bill’s proposed objectives to make definition more
comprehensive).
189. See U.S. House and Senate Consider Companion Bills to Reduce Cost of Financ-
ing Renewable Energy Resources, DISTRICTENERGY (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.district
energy.org/blog/2012/10/11/us-house-and-senate-consider-companion-bills-to-
reduce-cost-of-financing-renewable-energy-resources/ (discussing support behind
companion House and Senate bills).
190. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (providing Stanford professors’ sup-
port of Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act).
191. See id. (offering details of Stanford professors’ opinion editorial).
192. See id. (discussing bill’s ability to efficiently raise capital for renewables).
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same financial footing as traditional fossil fuel developers, thereby
allowing renewable energy producers to compete without Con-
gress’s tax credit support.193
Even with strong bi-partisan support, the MLP bill is unlikely to
pass.194  For example, The 113th Congress denied an early version
of the bill because many legislators wanted to wait to pass the bill
alongside comprehensive tax reform.195  In 2015, Sen. Coons rein-
troduced the bill and the 114th Congress could change their mind
because comprehensive tax reform looks far off.196  Congress wait-
ing to pass the bill has serious consequences because leaving the
MLP bill untouched allows fossil fuels to financially dominate re-
newable energy, while simultaneously harming the environment.197
Other members of Congress have expressed that they will only
extend MLPs to the renewable energy industry if Congress discon-
tinues all other existing tax subsidies to the industry.198  This argu-
ment has the same inaction problem as waiting for comprehensive
tax reform because Congress has committed itself to renewable en-
ergy tax credits through 2016; therefore, changes would not occur
193. See id. (explaining how if changes are not made to renewables’ current
funding mechanisms, they will never adequately be able to compete with
alternatives).
194. See Bipartisan Support for Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act Grows, U.S.
SENATOR CHRISTOPHER COONS OF DEL. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.coons.senate.
gov/newsroom/releases/release/bipartisan-support-for-master-limited-partner
ships-parity-act-grows (discussing MLP bill’s increased bipartisan support, as evi-
denced by U.S. Senators Mary Landrieu and Susan Collins choosing to co-sponsor
bill).
195. See Mantius supra note 16 (discussing federal legislators’ different opin-
ions on how to pass MLP bill).  While some legislators want to wait to pass the bill
along with more comprehensive tax reform, other legislators would prefer to aban-
don all tax subsidies to energy companies. See id.
196. See MLP Parity Act Reintroduced, BAKER BOTTS, (June 2015), http://
www.bakerbotts.com/ideas/publications/2015/06/mlp-update (providing Sen.
Coon’s 2015 MLP bill reintroduction). See also Republican Staff Comm. on Fin.,
Comprehensive Tax Reform for 2015 and Beyond, THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN.
(Dec. 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=
41af09bb-e75d-4246-9313-98eb5b9de7bc (providing mere discussions of compre-
hensive tax reform).  “[I]f we are ever going to make tax reform a reality, both
parties will have to come together to get it done.” Id.  “To some, that may seem
like a fairy tale.” Id.
197. See Mantius, supra note 16 (discussing how continuing with status quo
leads to “reverse carbon tax” and poses environmental concerns).
198. See id. (explaining lawmakers’ rationale for waiting to pass MLP bill).
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until at least 2016.199  In sum, even with bipartisan support, Con-
gress is unlikely to pass the MLP bill anytime soon.200
D. Benefits of Passing the MLP Bill
As previously discussed in earlier sections, passing the MLP bill
has substantial advantages for renewable energy, as it would in-
crease renewable energy’s access to capital and dramatically reduce
renewable energy projects’ costs.201  Extending MLPs to renewable
energy projects would open renewable projects to a new class of
investors, which would reduce project costs because more access to
capital means more bargaining power and options for renewable
energy developers.202
Extending the MLP structure to the renewable energy industry
would also give the industry the predictability and stability needed
to attract financial capital.203  Financial capital flocks to stable in-
dustries with relatively low risk and predictable rates of return.204
Renewable energy projects, especially solar and wind projects, gen-
erate these stable and predictable rates of return.205 Allowing these
solar and wind projects to use MLPs would permit these projects to
take advantage of the abundance of public capital that renewable
projects currently lack.206
199. See id. (discussing how lawmakers do not want MLP reform until it comes
with comprehensive tax reform); see also Team, supra note 124 (explaining Con-
gress’s commitment to Solar’s investment tax credit through 2016).
200. See Rapier, supra note 15 (explaining why Sen. Coons’s MLP Bill is un-
likely to pass).  Even with strong bipartisan support, “there are no hearings sched-
uled, and really nothing in the news about it.  Nobody in Congress seems to be
pushing it.” Id.
201. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (explaining advantages MLPs
could extend to renewables).
202. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (detailing how MLPs can attract
many new investors to renewables).
203. See W. Bruce Bullock et al., Leveling the Playing Field: The Case for Master
Limited Partnerships for Renewables, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 8 (May 2012), http://
awea.files.cms-http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/MLP%20
White%20Paper%20Final.pdf (stating MLPs appeal to many different investors
“[b]ecause of their high yield and relative safety”).
204. See id. at 18-19 (discussing how renewables wanting to attract capital,
such as solar and wind, must come up with sustainable business models that banks
want to market).
205. See Mantius, supra note 16 (discussing amending IRC 7704 and policy
implications); see also Molly F. Sherlock & Mark P. Keightley, Master Limited Partner-
ships: A Policy Option for the Renewable Energy Industry, CONG. RES. SERV., 14 (June 28,
2011), available at http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
08/masterlmtdpartnerships.pdf (analyzing policy implications of extending MLPs
to renewables).
206. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (arguing that MLPs would provide
renewable energy projects with desperately needed capital).
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Amending IRC Section 7704 to include renewable energy
would also provide funding permanence not currently found in the
tax credit system because it allows renewable developers to always
rely on public capital rather than certain-to-expire tax credits.207
This funding permanence would also allow renewable projects to
take advantage of certain tax benefits.208  The current tax credit re-
gime does not offer renewables funding permanence and long-
term renewable investment because Congress’s tax credit support
always has limited time frames.209  For instance, Congress letting
the wind industry’s vital production tax credit expire in 2014 made
completing wind projects more expensive as developers no longer
have federal support to rely on.210  Most renewable tax credit pro-
grams face these same limitations.211  Congress recognizing renew-
ables in the IRC would alleviate many of these time frame
concerns.212
Extending MLPs to the renewable energy industry has addi-
tional economic and environmental benefits; more capital creates
jobs, promotes a more diverse and carbon-neutral energy supply,
and democratizes the renewable energy investment process.213
First, renewable energy projects utilizing MLPs would create more
jobs because increased industry capital leads to more development
and projects, and subsequently more jobs.214  Second, the MLP
structure would promote a more diverse and carbon-neutral energy
supply because renewables would financially compete with the fossil
fuel industry.215  Investors would no longer lose out on better finan-
cial opportunities in the fossil fuel sector because renewable
207. See id. (discussing Congress’s fickle, renewable tax-credit regime and how
MLPs could permanently resolve these issues).
208. See id. (detailing MLP bill’s simple required tax code change).
209. See Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://
www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit (last visited July 28,
2015) (displaying Solar investment tax credit’s deadline of December 31, 2016); see
also Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), supra note 125 (showing how
Congress allowed production tax credit to expire in 2014).
210. See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), supra note 125 (detail-
ing Congress allowed tax credit to expire).
211. See Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), supra note 209 (detailing Solar invest-
ment tax credit’s imminent expiration).
212. See Energy Competitive, supra note 18 (hypothesizing that fixing IRC’s dis-
tinction between inexhaustible and exhaustible energy supplies would give renew-
ables needed financial stability to succeed).
213. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (discussing MLP benefits for
renewables).
214. See id. (discussing renewable energy’s need for good jobs and talent).
215. See id. (explaining how MLPs would diminish financial disparity between
renewables and fossil fuels).
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projects could offer similar rates of return.216  A comparable rate of
return to fossil fuels would increase renewables’ sales value and like-
lihood of completing more renewable projects because renewables
are a socially and economically beneficial alternative.217
Third, extending MLPs to renewable energy can democratize
the renewable energy investment process because individuals can
invest in renewable energy projects as limited partners through the
MLP structure.218  This is important because, as it currently stands,
only wealthier individuals and cash-rich companies have the oppor-
tunity to invest in renewable projects.219  In fact, large cash-rich
companies are the main investors for current renewable projects.220
Individuals looking to make a small contribution, like buying a few
shares of a company’s stock, cannot offer this kind of monetary sup-
port.221  Extending MLPs to renewables makes this small-scale in-
vesting possible and more accessible to all.222
V. THE MLP BILL’S POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS, AND THEIR
INSIGNIFICANCE
Although lawmakers recognize the MLP bill’s shortcomings,
extending MLPs to renewable energy undoubtedly has both envi-
ronmental and economic benefits.223  One of Congress’s main rea-
sons for limiting MLP usage is to prevent the tax base from further
erosion.224  Lawmakers are understandably reluctant to offer large
tax advantages to a new class of projects and companies, and fur-
216. See id. (discussing how MLPs allow renewables to compete financially
with fossil fuels).
217. See id. (providing how renewables taking advantage of MLPs would lead
to more renewable energy development).
218. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3 (analogizing MLPs to REITs and
expressing how REITs allow for large-scale retail investment).
219. See id. (detailing handful of investors that currently invest in renewable
projects).
220. See Kirkland, supra note 18 (discussing cash-rich companies that invest in
renewable projects).
221. See id. (providing that individual investors cannot provide small-scale in-
vestments in renewable projects).
222. See id. (analogizing MLPs to REITs and describing how REITs are capa-
ble of including small-scale retail investors).
223. See Mantius, supra note 16 (examining lawmakers’ analyses of MLP bill’s
shortcomings).  Some legislators want to consider the MLP bill as part of Con-
gress’s more comprehensive tax reform, while others want to eliminate MLPs en-
tirely. Id.
224. See Bullock, supra note 203, at 18 (highlighting difficulty of attaining
MLP bill approval in current political climate).
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ther deplete stagnant government revenues.225  The U.S. corporate
tax base has been shrinking for years due to one of the highest
corporate tax rates in the world.226  Many multi-national corpora-
tions have moved their global headquarters abroad to save in in-
come taxes.227  If MLPs were expanded, most renewable energy
companies would switch from corporations to MLPs in order to re-
duce their tax burden.228
Lawmakers are also reluctant to allow renewable energy
projects to take advantage of MLP structures because the industry is
so new and there is not enough data to prove that renewables are a
safe investment that produce steady cash flows for investors.229
MLP investors expect safe investments with steady cash returns.230
Bankers who market MLPs also want to know the business has the
underlying cash flows to fit the traditional MLP benefit of returning
capital to investors.231  For example, the oil pipeline business has
been a great fit for the MLP structure because of its stability in a
large industry and its ability to generate steady cash returns.232
Not all renewable projects, however, are created equal when it
comes to cash returns.233  Many renewable technologies do not
have proven track records of generating steady cash flows, like con-
ventional oil and gas.234  Wind and solar, however, are the excep-
225. See id. (discussing Congress’s reluctance to pass any initiatives without
closer examination).
226. See Corporate Tax Rates Table, supra note 74 (exhibiting high U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate).
227. See Richard Rubin, Cash Abroad Rises $206 Billion as Apple to IBM Avoid
Tax, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 12, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-03-12/cash-abroad-rises-206-billion-as-apple-to-ibm-avoid-tax
(exposing how many U.S. corporations have shifted profits abroad to avoid steep
U.S. income taxes).
228. See Mantius, supra note 16 (explaining how most companies switched to
MLPs when available).  MLP proliferation did not slow down until Congress specif-
ically sought to limit MLP usage. Id.
229. See Timothy Devetski & Sean Moran, Pros And Cons Of Recent Renewable
Energy Bill, LAW360 (May 8, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
438680/pros-and-cons-of-recent-renewable-energy-bill (discussing nature of renew-
able energy projects and their ability to generate steady cash flows).
230. See id. (displaying what bankers typically expect from MLPs).
231. See id. (discussing how MLPs need to be able to prove sustained underly-
ing cash flows to support cash distributions).
232. See Mider, supra note 113 (highlighting how many MLPs have been suc-
cessful for energy infrastructure projects).
233. See Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 205, at 11  (explaining how returns
from unproven renewable technologies are not clear and, therefore, not good for
MLPs).
234. See id. (explaining how MLPs will not be able to help unproven and non-
commercialized renewable technology).
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tions to renewable energy’s lack of steady cash flows.235  These
industries have established strong precedent for generating stable
and predictable cash flows over time, which fits the traditional MLP
structure.236  Congress, therefore, should at least allow solar and
wind projects the opportunity to use MLPs.237
Finally, some political experts believe the U.S. would benefit
from limiting the MLP structure even further.238  Rather than ex-
tend MLPs to renewables, these experts would revoke the fossil fuel
industry’s ability to use MLPs.239  Supporters of this argument be-
lieve the government must improve the corporate tax base in our
current economy.240  Preventing fossil fuels from utilizing MLPs
helps level the playing field for renewable energy in a more eco-
nomically efficient way for the government.241  Eradicating MLPs
altogether increases government revenues from traditional fossil fu-
els and maintains existing revenues from the renewable energy
industry.242
While eliminating MLPs does level the financial playing field
for renewables and fossil fuels, it does not provide the renewable
energy industry with the incentives, innovation, and capital needed
to grow.243 Eliminating MLPs altogether keeps substantial limits on
renewables’ access to capital while more established fossil fuels
would have an easier time raising funds in traditional capital
markets.244
235. See Devetski & Moran, supra note 229 (discussing solar and wind’s track
record for producing steady cash flows).
236. See id. (explaining how solar and wind’s long-term power purchase agree-
ments fit MLP’s ideal model).
237. See id. (discussing solar and winds ideal fit for MLP model).
238. See Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 205, at 10 (describing policy con-
cerns for extending MLPs to renewables).
239. See id. (highlighting some legislators’ belief maintaining MLPs may not
be sustainable).
240. See id. (discussing potential for corporate tax base erosion and lost fed-
eral government revenue).
241. See id. (providing Congress with opportunity to increase revenues by
making all MLPs convert to corporations).
242. See id. (illustrating potential outcome of eliminating MLPs entirely).
243. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 1-2 (discussing important reasons
why renewables need MLPs to grow).
244. See Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM), YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.
com/q?s=XOM (last updated Oct. 2, 2015, 4:00 PM) (showing how fossil fuel com-
panies already have existing footprints in public capital markets). Fossil fuel com-
panies have existing and strong footprints in public capital markets as
demonstrated by Exxon Mobil’s $324 billion market capitalization.
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Access to the MLP structure also offers the renewable energy
industry more than just fundraising advantages.245  It allows renew-
ables to take on more projects around the country, aligning U.S.
Tax Policy with U.S. Energy Policy.246  In order for the U.S. to meet
its long-term energy and environmental goals, it needs significant
deployment of many more renewable projects; tax base erosion ap-
pears to be a reasonable price to pay.247  The extension of the MLP
structure allows more deployment of renewable energy capacity
throughout the country, while subsequently weaning the U.S. off a
severe fossil fuel addiction.248
The argument that renewables are not established enough to
take advantage of MLPs has some validity, but not all renewables
are created equal.249  Wind and solar projects are proven, reliable
assets capable of generating stable rates of return.250  Furthermore,
the less predictable renewables, such as harnessing ocean wave
power, could become more predictable if they attract more capital;
more capital inevitably leads to innovation and efficiencies in the
marketplace.251
Finally, eliminating MLPs entirely seems like a sensible policy
option because it can expand the U.S.’ shrinking tax base.252  This
policy, however, is flawed because it stymies all U.S. energy develop-
ment rather than promoting industry growth for renewables.253
The U.S. needs more renewable energy capacity to improve the en-
245. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (discussing advantages of al-
lowing renewables to use MLPs).
246. See Joshua S. Hill, U.S. & Brazil Pledge Jointly to Raise Renewable Energy to
20% by 2030, CLEANTECHNICA (July 1, 2015), http://cleantechnica.com/2015/07/
01/us-brazil-pledge-jointly-raise-renewable-energy-20-2030/ (detailing U.S.’s com-
mitment to further renewable energy development).
247. See id. (depicting U.S.’s lofty renewable energy goals); see also Invest But
Reform, supra note 121 at 3-4 (discussing benefits MLPs can potentially bring to
renewable energy).  The hefty list of benefits MLPs can provide renewable energy
development seems to outweigh the potential lost government revenue. See Invest
But Reform, supra note 121 at 3-4.
248. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (detailing laundry list of bene-
fits MLPs can bring renewables).
249. See Devetski & Moran, supra note 229 (explaining why solar and wind are
better for MLPs than other renewable energy sources).  Solar and wind fit the MLP
model because each has a history of consistently producing long-term projects that
produce steady and sustainable cash flows. Id.
250. See id. (confirming solar and wind’s reliable asset class status).
251. See Sherlock & Keightley, supra note 205, at 10 (discussing how technol-
ogy for harnessing ocean waves has not yet been tested).
252. See id. (discussing why Congress eliminating MLPs altogether might be
good for shrinking U.S. federal tax base).
253. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3 (discussing why offering MLPs
to renewables offers better policy options than eliminating MLPs entirely).
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vironment and reach its federal renewable energy goals.254  Elimi-
nating the opportunity for fossil fuel companies to take advantage
of the MLP structure may level the playing field for both types of
energy development, however, it does not help renewable energy’s
fundraising problems.255  Keeping MLPs from renewable projects
continues the existing problems because financial capital would still
be hard to acquire.256  Renewable energy deserves a better an-
swer.257  Considering the concern for fossil fuels, Congress should
allow renewables to take advantage of MLPs to promote growth of
the renewable energy industry around the country.258
VI. IMPACT
Extending MLPs to renewable energy would help the U.S. as a
whole, as well as individual states, meet renewable energy goals.259
Currently, most states have a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in
place, requiring state energy providers to use a specified percentage
of renewable energy in their energy supply mix, or risk a fine.260
RPS requirements vary considerably across states, depending upon
how aggressive the state is in achieving its goals.261  Each year, nev-
254. See id. (discussing U.S.’s need for more renewable energy); see also Office
of the Press Secretary, Presidential Memorandum—Federal Leadership on Energy Man-
agement, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2013/12/05/presidential-memorandum-federal-leadership-energy-management
(discussing federal government’s leadership role in renewable energy policy).
255. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 1-2 (discussing why eliminating
MLPs altogether would be ineffective in promoting renewable energy
development).
256. See id. (highlighting how renewable projects are still desperate for
capital).
257. See id. (emphasizing that renewable energy needs better answers and
MLPs can help).
258. See id. (providing Congress should give renewables access to MLPs like
they gave to individual investors with REITs).
259. See Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
MIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 (dis-
cussing how most states require renewable energy generation); see also Hill, supra
note 246 (highlighting federal government’s renewable energy goals).
260. See Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 259 (explain-
ing renewable portfolio standards); see also Alternative Compliance Payment Rates,
MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/renewable-energy
/rps-aps/retail-electric-supplier-compliance/alternative-compliance-payment-rates
.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (discussing alternative compliance payments).  In
a state with a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), an energy supplier can supply
electricity from a renewable source, purchase another renewable developer’s gen-
eration through renewable energy credits, or pay an alternative compliance pay-
ment set by the state. Id.  Electricity providers have their choice among the above
options. Id.
261. See Renewables Portfolio Standard, DSIRE http://programs.dsireusa.org/
system/program/detail/840 (last updated Feb. 4, 2015) (providing California’s
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ertheless, all states with RPSs increase the amount of its energy sup-
ply that must consist of renewables.262
States have varying RPS goals that are partially the result of ge-
ography.263  For example, California has a substantially more ag-
gressive RPS goal than Ohio, due in part to its greater supply of
natural resources.264  Additionally, state RPS goals vary due to state-
level politics and the different strategies employed to financially
support renewables.265  Renewables are an easier sell in some states
than in others.266  For instance, California’s strong support of
renewables has public backing and utilizes taxpayer funds in reach-
ing its RPS goals.267  Other states are not as willing to allocate large
portions of their budgets for renewables.268
If Congress extends MLPs to renewables, it would be easier for
all states to meet and increase their RPS goals, regardless of the
varying political climate.269  MLP financing would make it easier for
RPS statistics).  In California, energy providers must have 33% of all electricity pro-
vided come from renewable sources by 2020. Compare id.; with  Alternative Energy
Portfolio Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/
2934 (last updated July 24, 2014) (providing Ohio’s RPS statistics).  In Ohio, elec-
tric utilities must provide 12.5% of their electric generation from renewable
sources by 2026. Id.
262. See Renewables Portfolio Standard, supra note 261 (showing each state’s an-
nual RPS implementation standard).
263. See id. (detailing California’s drastic RPS standard).
264. See id. (demonstrating California’s aggressive RPS); see also Mike
Gaworecki, California Governor Proposes Most Ambitious Renewable Energy Target in
U.S., DESMOG (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.desmogblog.com/2015/01/
06/california-sets-ambitious-new-renewable-energy-target (explaining reasons why
one state might have more aggressive RPS goals than another).
265. See California Financial Incentives, DATABASE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, RENEW-
ABLE ENERGY, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?state=CA (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2015) (offering all state’s incentives for renewables).  California
offers many financial incentives for renewable technology to achieve their renewa-
ble goals including an expensive self-generation incentive program and California
sponsored solar-photovoltaic incentives. Id.
266. See Gaworecki, supra note 264 (discussing citizens’ ability to impact re-
newable energy policies).  California citizens’ great support of progressive renewa-
ble energy policies makes it easier for state lawmakers to pursue aggressive
renewable energy goals. See id. (explaining how California citizens’ political will
makes it easier for its Governor to pursue renewable energy goals).
267. See id. (discussing how California’s people like to be leaders in con-
fronting environmental problems such as global warming).
268. See Voluntary Renewable Portfolio Goal, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.
org/system/program/detail/2528 (last updated Feb. 8, 2015) (offering statistics
about Virginia’s voluntary RPS standard).  Virginia has implemented a voluntary
RPS with no state-level financial support. Id.  For a discussion of California’s
mandatory and subsidized program, see Renewables Portfolio Standard, supra note
261.
269. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3-4 (discussing why federal MLPs
would make renewable project finance easier in all states).
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states to meet their respective RPS goals because renewables would
require less financial support from the state.270  MLPs allow renew-
ables to secure funding through public capital markets rather than
relying on state and federal subsidized programs.271  Capital attrac-
tion features of MLPs would also drive down renewable project
costs, making it easier for state politicians to pursue aggressive RPS
goals.272  State politicians, therefore, would have an easier time pro-
moting state RPS goals because they would no longer need to sub-
stantially rely on taxpayer funds.273  Congress should extend MLPs
to renewables and enhance the U.S.’ ability to use renewable en-
ergy forevermore.274
David C. Magagna*
270. See id. (explaining how MLPs would lessen need for state-level tax cred-
its).  Federal MLPs would broaden renewables’ capital access and make state finan-
cial support less determinative in renewable project outcomes. Id.; see also Peter
Danko, State Renewable Energy Rankings Place California in the Top Spot, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/state-renewable-energy-rank
ings_n_1316647.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2012, 10:46 AM) (discussing California
as leader for renewable energy).
271. See Invest But Reform, supra note 121, at 3 (explaining benefits of MLPs
and how they can promote renewable energy development across U.S.).
272. See id. (emphasizing ability of MLPs to lower capital costs).
273. See id. (discussing capital attraction features MLPs provide).
274. See id. (explaining benefits MLPs could provide to renewable energy).
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
M.S., 2012, Villanova University; B.S., 2011, Syracuse University.
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